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CHAPTER I

TESTING FORECAST RATIONALITY UNDER ASYMMETRIC LOSS WITH THE
MINCER-ZARNOWITZ REGRESSION
1.1 Introduction

The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) underlies most modern macroeconomics.
Assuming agents face quadratic loss, the rational forecast is the mean of a series
conditional on available information. If the forecast is the conditional mean, the forecast
errors should have mean zero and be orthogonal to any variable in the information set.
The unbiasedness and efficiency properties implied by the REH have been frequently
tested using forecasts obtained from surveys of professional forecasters. In one of the first
formal tests of unbiasedness and efficiency, Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) proposed
regressing the observed series on an intercept and the forecast, and testing whether
intercept is zero and the coefficient on the forecast is one. Most unbiasedness and
efficiency tests are a variation of the Mincer-Zarnowitz (MZ) regression test. Although
the results depend on the survey being used, the sample period and the series being
considered, unbiasedness and efficiency are often rejected for the forecasts obtained from
surveys. Pesaran and Weale (2006) provide an excellent survey of the conclusions from
rationality tests using forecast survey data.
Rather than concluding that agents are irrational, researchers have recently proposed

that the apparent bias and inefficiency in the survey forecasts may be due to the fact that
forecasters face asymmetric loss. Granger (1969) and Christoffersen and Diebold (1997)
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showed that under asymmetric loss, the optimal forecast is the conditional mean plus a
bias that depends on the second and higher order conditional moments of the process and
on the parameters in the loss function. Batchelor and Peel (1998) showed that standard
regression tests can be modified to provide a valid test for forecast unbiasedness and
efficiency in the presence of asymmetric loss assuming agents have linex loss and the
conditional distribution of the innovation series is normal. More recently, Elliot,
Komunjer and Timmerman (2005) proposed a GMM test of forecast rationality when the
loss function is asymmetric power. Patton and Timmerman (2007) presented a very
general test which only assumes the loss function is homogeneous and that the dynamics
of the process can be represented through a time-varying conditional mean and variance.
In this paper, we build on the results of Batchelor and Peel (1998) and show that the
MZ regression can be modified to provide a valid test of forecast rationality for any of the
loss functions and assumed dynamic properties of the series that have been considered in
the literature. In the next section, we first provide a detailed analysis of the probability
limits of the coefficients in the conventional MZ regression to show how asymmetric loss
and the process dynamics affect the standard test. We then show at a very general level
how to augment the MZ regression to make it a valid test for rationality in the presence of
asymmetric loss. In section 1.3, we demonstrate how the augmented regression can be
used to test rationality when the loss function is homogenous and the dynamics of the
process are captured through a time-varying conditional mean and variance. We
emphasize the advantages and disadvantages of our test compared to those of Elliott,

Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) and Patton and Timmermann (2007). In section 1.4,
we show how the augmented regression can be used to test rationality when the loss

2

function is linex and there is a closed form expression for the moment generating
function of the conditional distribution of the series. In section 1.5, we present an
empirical example in which we use the augmented MZ regression to test whether
inflation forecasts from the Livingston survey are rational allowing for asymmetric loss.
Section 1.6 is a short conclusion.

1.2 Augmented Mincer-Zarnowitz Regression

Let y„ t - 1

T be an observed sequence of stationary random variables. Using

information in period /, agents forecast yt at horizon h. The series in period (t+h) can be
decomposed as
yt+h

=

ftt+h.t + £t+h>

(1)
where Ht+h,t is the mean of the process conditional on the the information set available in
period t and et+h is an innovation which has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the
elements in the information set. The forecasted value of yt+h conditioned on the
information set available at time period / is denoted by yt+h,t- Under quadratic loss the
optimal predictor is yt+h,t= Ht+h,t and the forecast error is the innovation y,+h -yt+h,t - Et+hAs a result, the forecasts are unbiased and the forecast errors are uncorrelated with the
elements of the information set used to construct the forecast.
Assuming the loss is only a function of the forecast error, Granger (1969) and

Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) showed that under asymmetric loss the optimal
predictor is

3

yt+h,t — Mt+kt + At+h,

(2)
where Xt+h depends on the loss function and the conditional moments of order two and
higher. The presence of asymmetric loss introduces a bias into the forecast. If agents have
an asymmetric loss function, the usual properties of rational forecasts no longer hold.
Apparent irrationality may be due to asymmetric loss.
The standard test of forecast rationality is the MZ regression and is conducted
under the assumption of quadratic loss. The MZ regression regresses the actual value of
the series on the forecasted value and tests the joint hypothesis that the constant is zero
and the slope coefficient is one. The regression takes the form
yt+h = ao + aiyt+h,t + Ut+h-

(3)
Testing a0 = 0 provides a test of forecast unbiasedness and testing ai = 1 provides
a test of forecast efficiency. Under quadratic loss, the optimal h-step ahead forecast is the
conditional mean, so (3) is equivalent to (1) with ao - 0 and ai - 1. In contrast, when the
loss function is asymmetric the MZ regression for testing rationality is inappropriate
because
yt+h

=

9t+h ~ ^-t+h.t + £t+h,t-

(4)
The conventional MZ regression omits the variable At+ht.

The least square

estimators of the coefficients are inconsistent if we omit a variable which is correlated
with the other regressors. The probability limits of the regression coefficients under a
general loss function are presented in the following proposition.
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Proposition-: Assuming the bias is strictly a function of the forecast error, in the MZ
regression (3), the probability limit of the LS estimator of the slope coefficient is
Plim(a ) =
1

var i

O t+ft,t)+coH/'t+/i,tA+/i,t)

var(iit+hit)+var(Xt+h:t)+2cov(nt+hit,lt+hit)

(5)
and the probability limit of the intercept is
Plim(a0) = ny - (piy +

n^Plimia^)
(6)

where pty = E(yt) is the unconditional mean of yt and n% = E(At) is the unconditional mean
of X,.
Proof-: We have that
„,. f^ .
Phm^a-iJ =

cov(yt+h,yt+hit)
^-r
^L
var(yt+hit)
*t+h,t)

var(nt+h,t + *t+n,t)
(7)
where we substitute in the value of yt+h from (1) and yt+h,t fr°m (2)- Using the fact that
£t+h,t is orthogonal to the information set in period t, we can easily simplify (6) to get
(4). Also
Plim(a.Q) = Plim(y) — Plimid^Plim^y)
= E(nt+h.t) ~ Plim(&i)E(jit+hit) - PZfm(a1)£(At+ft|t),
(8)
which is (6).

The above proposition indicates the behavior of the MZ regression depends on
whether At+ht

is time-varying, and if so, the value of cov(jit+ht, At+ht).

If At+ht

is time

invariant, then cov(nt+ht, At+ht)= 0 and var(At+ht) = 0. It is then easily seen that
Plim(d\) = 1 and Plim(do) = -fix. The slope coefficient is consistent but the intercept has
an upward asymptotic bias if fix is negative and a downward asymptotic bias if fix is
positive. In this case, the MZ regresion is likely to reject rationality due to the bias in the
forecast even though the bias may be rational given the loss function. When At+ht
varying but cov(fit+ht,At+ht)=

is time

0, the estimator of the slope coefficient will have a

downward asymptotic bias
var

, ->
Plimiai)
=

(.t1t+ht)
u*t+h,tj

?

<

x

var([it+Kt) + var{At+hx)
When [it+hit and At+ht

are correlated, the direction of the asymptotic bias in the

estimator of the slope coefficient depends on the sign of the covariance. If cov(fit+ht
*t+h,t) > °> t h e n
PhmM =

?

r—

Y

r—

T

'—

r< 1

If cov(fit+ht Af+ht) < 0, the sign of Plim^d^) is indeterminate. If var(At+ht)
cov(ixt+Kt,At+ht),

then Plim^d^

1, while if var(At+ht)

<

>

cov(ixt+h>t,At+hx),

Plim^dx) < 1. For most of the loss functions that have been considered in the literature,
A-t+n.t i s

a

simple function of second and higher order moments. Depending on the

variable being forecasted, there may be prior knowledge about whether At+ht
varying and the likely sign of cov(jit+ht,At+ht).
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is time

In such a case, the researcher may be

able to conjecture about the direction of the bias in d\. We will illustrate this later in the
paper.
To test forecast rationality under possibly asymmetric loss using the MZ
regression it is necessary to include Xt+ht in the regression. Let a denote the parameters
in loss function and let 6 denote the parameters in the conditional distribution of et+hForecast rationality can in principle be tested by estimating the augmented MincerZarnowitz (AMZ) regression
7t+h = a o + ai9t+h,t ~ At+n,t(a> *0 + £t+h,t

(9)
by maximum likelihood and testing a0 = 0 and ax = 1. In (9) we explicitly show the
dependence of At+ht

on a and A. Again, the exact parametric form of At+ht(a,9)

will

depend on the assumed loss function employed by forecasters and the specified
conditional distribution of et+h. Note in (9) if At+htt(a, 0) is time invariant, it is not
separately identifiable from a 0 . This implies that all of the dynamics of the process are
completely captured through the conditional mean, which is true for many economic time
series. The AMZ regression cannot be used to determine if a bias in the forecasts is due to
asymmetric loss. In the absence of time-varying higher order moments, however, is still
meaningful to test forecast efficiency by testing Ho:ai = 1. If At+ht(a,6)

is time

varying, a and 0 may be identified in (9). For most of the loss functions that have been
proposed, a is a scalar and the parameters in (9) are fully identified. An advantage of
using the AMZ regression to test for forecast rationality is that it provides an estimate of
the parameter in the loss function. Assuming that a is identified, if the null hypothesis of
forecast unbiasedness cannot be rejected in (8), one can then estimate
7

e

t+h ~ —At+h,t(.a>8)

+

£

t+h

(10)
where et+h = yt+h

— yt+hit,

by maximum likelihood to obtain a fully efficient estimator

of a. In the following subsections we present examples of the AMZ regression (8) for
different loss functions that have been used in the literature on forecasting under
asymmetric loss.

1.3 Homogeneous Loss Functions With Mean-Variance Dynamics

A broad class of loss functions is the homogeneous class where for any constant c and
some £
l\c(yt+h ~ 9t+n.t)] = ckL(yt+h

-

yt+h,t).

For this class of loss functions, Granger (1999) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)
showed that the optimal predictor is yt+h,t

=

Vt+h.t + ^t+h.^t+h.u where Ct+ht is the

variance of yt+f,, conditional on information in period t and cot+ht

is a function of the

parameters in the loss function and the third and higher order conditional moments of
yt+h- If all of the dynamics oiyt+h are captured through a time-varying conditional mean
and conditional variance, then (ot+ht

= a)(a, 0) is constant and is a function of only the

parameters a in the loss function and the time-invariant parameters 6 in the conditional
distribution of yt+h. The AMZ regression (8) becomes
yt+h = ao + <h.9t+n.t " ^(a- O)0t+h,t + £t+h.t(11)
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Assuming a parametric form for the loss function and the conditional distribution
of et+h will determine a parametric form for (o(a, 9). Adding a parametric model for
a

t+h,t> (11) c a n b e estimated by maximum likelihood and the joint hypothesis a0 = 0 and

ai - 1 can be tested using a Wald test. The model (11) is a generalization of the Engle,
Lilien and Robins (1987) ARCH-M model.
If the conditional distribution of et+h is a member of a location-scale family, such
as the normal distribution, then co(a,6) = co(a,0) = — a2 will depend only on the
parameters in the loss function. The AMZ regression (1.8) then reduces to
yt+h

= a

0 + al9t+h,t ~~ a2°t+h,t + £t+h,t

(12)
This is a conventional ARCH-M model and can be estimated by maximum
likelihood using standard software and the hypotheses ao = 0 and a\ = 1 again tested with
a Wald test. Note that the rationality test based on the AMZ regression (12) only assumes
homogeneity of the loss function, not a specific functional form. If the loss function is
assumed known, it will typically depend on a single parameter so thata 6 R. If this is the
case, by the invariance principle of the MLE, the MLE of a can be obtained as a =
^_1(-«2)-

We illustrate the AMZ regression (12) assuming the agent's loss function is a
member of the asymmetric power loss family considered by Elliot, Komunjer and
Timmermann (2005). This
family of loss functions is specified as
L(yt+n ~ 9t+h,t) = [a + (1 - 2a)l{yt+h - yt+hx

< 0)]\yt+h -

yt+hx\v
(13)

9

where a G (0,1) and /(.) is the indicator function that takes the value one when the
condition in the argument is true. The power/? is assumed to be known. The loss function
(13) is clearly homogenous of degree p. This family of loss functions includes many of
the loss functions commonly used in the literature. When a - 0.5 the loss function is
symmetric and becomes the standard symmetric linear and quadratic loss functions for
p-\

and p-2. When a =£0.5, the loss function is asymmetric and becomes linlin loss

whenp=l and quadquad loss when/>=2. If in addition to (13) we also assume that yt+h is
conditionally normal, the AMZ regression takes the form (12). Assuming p is known, the
AMZ regression (12) can also be used to estimate the parameter a in the loss function
(13). Higgins (2007) showed that for a normal conditional distribution and an asymmetric
power loss function with given/) and a, the parameter 02 in (12) satisfies the equation
(1 - a) j^Jz

- a J P " 1 0(z)dz - a Qz

- a ^ " 1 0(z)dz = 0
(14)

where <p(z) is the standard normal density. Equation (14) is the first order condition for
U2 = - o)(a,p) in the optimal predictor yt+ti,t = Pt+h.t + a2at+h,t- ^n g enera l> there is no
analytical solution for 02 in (14). Higgins (2007) tabulated numerical solutions for o 2 for
p G {1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00} and an extensive number of values for a G (0, 1). Given
a chosen p and a point estimate of 02 from (12), Table 1 in Higgins (2007) can be used to
interpolate an estimate for a.
Assuming agents have asymmetric power loss (13) and that the series is
conditionally normal, the proposition of the previous section can be use to access the
direction of the bias in the standard MZ regression in which At+h = a2(Tt+h.,t

ls

omitted

from (12). The nature of the bias will depend on the sign of 02 and the correlation
10

between /jt+hi, and <Jt+ht. Having specified/*, the sign of a^ is determined by a from (14).
To consider a concrete example, suppose we are testing the rationality of forecasts of
rates of return on an asset produced by a financial analyst. Also suppose the analyst faces
linlin loss so that/> = 1 in (13) and from (14) it is seen that a2 = < t ,-1 (a) , where 4>-1 (.)
is the standard normal CDF. For many assets, empirical evidence suggest that both /ut+h,i
and at+ht

are time-varying. Furthermore, finance theory asserts there is a positive

relationship between expected return and risk. This implies cov{pLt+ht, at+h t ) > 0. If the
analyst views under predicting the return as more costly, then a > .5 and 02 > 0. The
coefficient ax will have a downward asymptotic bias. If the analyst views overpredicting
the return as more costly, so that a < .5 and 02 < 0, the asymptotic bias in ax is
indeterminate.
Other tests of forecast rationality under asymmetric loss have been proposed.
Elliot, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) presented a GMM J-test derived from the first
order condition for the optimal choice of yt+h.t m

tne

asymmetric power loss family (13).

The statistic is based on the orthogonality condition between the gradient of (13) and
variables zt assumed to be used in the construction of the forecast. The orthogonality
condition also provides an estimator of the asymmetry parameter a. The test assumes
suitable instruments zt are known and that the z,'s enter linearly in the forecast function.
The test is limited to the asymmetric power loss family and assumes thatp = 1 ox p = 2.
The test advocated in this paper only requires the specification of a parametric model for
the conditional variance. If the conditional variance is assumed to be ARCH, for
example, no knowledge of the zt variables is required. The appropriateness of the
parametric model for the conditional variance can be easily tested by testing for higher
11

order dependence in the standardized residuals

from

(12). Also, the AMZ

regression test based on (12) only requires that the loss function is homogenous. It does
not assume the loss is a member of the asymmetric loss family (13). The loss function
(13) is only assumed in order to estimate a.
More recently, Patton and Timmermann (2007) advocated a very general test for
forecast rationality which only assumed homogenous loss and mean-variance dynamics
based on the representation (11). They observed that the standardized forecast errors
dt+h,t = yt+*

yt+hX

= -(o(.a,6) + ut+h,

where

ut+h = £t+h/at.ht,

are

serially

uncorrected and orthogonal to any variables zt in the agents' information set. Given an
estimator at+ht

of the conditional standard deviation, rationality can be tested by testing

for serial correlation in dt+ht =yt+*

yt+h,t

aad

by testing for significance in the

regression of dt+ht on z,. This test presumes that the estimator dt+h,t is available. Patton
and Timmermann (2007) suggested that 8t+ht could be a nonparametric estimator of the
standard deviation of yt+h conditional on zt. For such an estimator to be consistent, it
would be necessary to correctly specify all of the variables in information set used by the
forecasters. This is very difficult to do. As emphasized above, The AMZ test does not
necessarily require specifying any zt variables. Patton and Timmermann's test is a twostep procedure which first requires estimating the conditional variance. The AMZ test is
presumably more powerful than their test if the parametric model is correctly specified
because it is based on maximum likelihood estimation. Patton and Timmermann (2007)
clearly stated that their test procedure cannot be extended to nonhomogenous loss

12

functions. In contrast the AMZ test can be applied to nonhomogenous loss functions as
we show in the next section.

1.4 Linex Loss Function

The AMZ rationality test can also be applied to test if agents optimally forecast under
linex loss. Varian (1974) introduced the linex loss function,

L(yt+n - 9t+h,t) = exp{a(yt+n ~ 9t+h,t)} ~ a{yt+n - 9t+n,t) -1
when a > 0, the loss is approximately exponential for positive forecast errors and
approximately linear for negative forecast errors, whereas, if a < 0, the loss is
approximately linear for positive errors and approximately exponential for negative
errors. Zellner (1986) showed that the optimal predictor is
9t+n,t = lh+h.t + ^ l Q g (Et[exp{a(yt+h - 9t+h,t)}])
(15)
In (15), Et[exp{cc(yt+h — yt+h,t)}] is the centered conditional moment generating
function (MGF) of yt+h, and hence, the precise expression for the optimal predictor will
depend on the conditional distribution of y t + h . Notice that the linex loss function is not
homogenous, and therefore, the tests of Patton and Timmermann (2007) described in the
previous section cannot be used to test for forecast rationality. In contrast, the AMZ
rationality test has a particularly simple form.
Assuming normality, the optimal predictor under linex loss is yt+h,t = Mt+h,t +
aof+ht/2

and the AMZ regression becomes

13

Vt+h — a0 + al9t+h,t + a2at+h,t + £t+h
(16)
where a2 = -a/2. Like (12), (16) is a standard ARCH-M model. We can estimate (16)
by maximum likelihood and test a0 = 0 and a} = 1. The MLE of the parameter in the loss
function is immediately given by a = 2d2. The forecast rationality test based on the
regression (16) is essentially the one originally proposed be Batchelor and Peel (1998).
Notice that in spite of the differences between linex and the asymmetric power loss
function, the AMZ regression (16) differs from (12) only in that (16) adds the conditional
variance whereas (12) adds the conditional standard deviation. As we did in the previous
section, we can use the proposition to analyze the consequences of omitting the
augmenting variable from the regression (16). If af+ht is constant, the slope coefficient is
consistent but the estimator of the intercept is asymptotically biased, the size and the
direction of the bias depends on the magnitude and sign of a. When of+ht is time
varying, PlimiaJ

< 1 if cov(nt+h,a?+flt)

= 0. If cov(nt+h,o?+hx)

> 0 and a > 0,

then Plimia^) < 1. But if a < 0, then the sign of the Plimid^
indeterminate. Similarly if cov(jit+h,ot+hx)

— 1 will be

< 0 and a < 0, then Plimia^) < 1. But if a

> 0, the sign of Plimid-J — 1 will be indeterminate.
Depending on the variable being forecasted, the normality assumption which
leads to the AMZ regression (16) may not be appropriate. For example, if the forecasts
are for rates of returns on financial assets, it is well known that such returns have tails
heavier than the normal distribution. The t-distribution is often used to model the
distribution of asset returns. The t-distribution, however, does not have a finite MGF. The
optimal predictor (15) is not defined, and therefore, there is no meaningful AMZ
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rationality test. But this reflects the fact that when the predictive density lacks higher
order moments, linex loss is probably not an appropriate loss function and agents don't
employ it. As an alternative heavy-tailed distribution, it may be reasonable to assume that
the innovations have a conditional Laplace distribution with conditional density

/Ot+/i) =

~l £ t+h,t|

i
exp<
V^°~t+h,t
v

a2

-1

The optimal predictor is yt+h

= nt+htt — a l o g (1

^t+h,t)

an(

* the AMZ regression

becomes
a2

yt+h

= a0 + a^t^t

+ a^logil

-—af+hit)

+ £t+h
(17)

Although not a standard ARCH-M model, (17) can be estimated by maximum
likelihood. Again the MLE's can be used to test ao = 0 and ai = 1. In other contexts
different distributional assumptions may be appropriate. For example, if the variable
being forecasted is non-negative, it may be plausible to assume that the predictive density
is Gamma or Weibull. Both of these distributions have closed form parametric
expressions for their MGF's and it is straightforward to write down the AMZ regression
for testing forecast rationality.

1.5 Asymmetric Loss and U.S. Inflation Forecasts

To illustrate the tests described in the preceding sections, we examine whether the
apparent bias in inflation forecasts may be due to forecasters having an asymmetric loss
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function. As shown above, the AMZ regression can be used to test for bias and efficiency
in the presence of asymmetric loss when second and higher order conditional moments
are time-varying and correlated with the conditional mean of the series being forecasted.
Freidman (1977) conjectured that high inflation is associated with high inflation
uncertainty, suggesting that the conditional mean and condition variance of inflation are
positively correlated. Beginning with Engle (1982) and Engle (1983), a long line of
research has established that inflation does have a time-varying conditional variance.
We use the Livingston survey of forecasters because it is the longest running survey
which contains data on inflation forecasts. The semi-annual survey started in 1946 and is
published in June and December of each year. Among other things, respondents are asked
to predict the level of the CPI six months ahead. We start our sample in 1954 to avoid the
period of U.S. price controls during the Korean conflict. We end our sample in
December, 2003 because after that survey respondents were asked to forecast the
seasonally adjusted CPI rather then the unadjusted CPI. We use the median consensus
forecast of the CPI. The six month horizon inflation rate and inflation forecasts are
calculated following Carlson's (1977) method from the realized CPI and the forecasted
CPI series.
In the first column of Table 1, we present the MZ regression for the inflation
forecasts. Both individual t-tests and the joint F-test reject forecast unbiasedness and
efficiency at the 5 percent significance level. For these tests, the null hypothesis
implicitly maintains that the forecasts are rational under quadratic loss. To test rationality

in the presence of possibly asymmetric power loss or linex loss using the AMZ
regressions (12) and (16), we must demonstrate that the inflation innovation has time-
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varying conditional variance. We assume time variation in the condition variance can be
represented by a G/ARCH process. For the conditional variance specification
°t+h,t

= a

0 + al£

t +

I" ap£

t,t-p+l-

We want to test the null hypothesis HQ: ax = ••• = ccp =without also imposing quadratic
loss under the null. The LM test for ARCH in the ARCH-m model is nonstandard
because the parameter in 02 in (12) and (16) is not identified under the null. Bera and Ra
(1995) suggested the Sup LM(o?) statistic be used and a conservative critical value
computed by the method of Davies (1987). They showed the test has better power than
the conventional LM test that imposes a0 = 0. In Table 2, we report the conventional LM
test and the test for ARCH in the AMZ regression (12). The reported supremum of the
LM statistic is calculated for ai in the interval (-3,3). Experimentation shows that the
results are not sensitive to the choice of the interval. As seen in the table, the
conventional LM statistics are not significant at any order p. In contrast, the Sup LM
statistics are highly significant at all orders and suggest that inflation has time-varying
second moments.
In Table 1, we also present the AMZ regressions (12) and (16) which assume the
loss functions are asymmetric power and linex. We model the time-varying conditional
variance with a GARCH(1,1) process <xt2+lt = a0 + ax£\ + P\at.t-i-

Under linex loss,

the parametric form of the augmenting term in (16) depends strongly on the assumption
the innovation £t has a conditional normal distribution. Under asymmetric power loss the
parametric form of the augmenting term in (12) depends only on the assumption the
innovation distribution is a member of a location-scale family. A normality assumption is
required to use (12) to estimate the asymmetry parameter a. The Jarque-Bera normality
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statistics computed with the standardized residuals it/ at are insignificant for all of the
models in Table 1. The statistics are insignificant and suggest the normality assumption is
not inappropriate. Q-statistics at order 4 and 8 computed with the squared standardized
residuals are also insignificant for all of the models, indicating the GARCH(1,1) model
adequately captures the dependence in the second moments of inflation. For the
asymmetric power loss and linex loss AMZ regressions report in Table 1, the individual
t-tests and the joint Wald tests for H0:a0 = 0, ai = 1 are not significant. Although
rationality cannot be rejected, the augmenting terms in both the asymmetric power and
linex augmenting regressions are insignificant. This may be due to multi-collinearity
between the forecast yt+\,t

ana

" the augmenting terms in (12) and (16). Recall it is the

correlation between the forecast and the augmenting term which invalidates the MZ
regression under asymmetric loss. To examine this possibility, we re-estimate (12) and
(16) imposing a0 = 0 and a\ = 1. The results are in the last two columns of Table 1. When
rationality is imposed, the augmenting terms become significant.
These final two regressions in Table 1 can be used to obtain fully efficient
estimators of the asymmetry parameter a. Under asymmetric power loss, assuming p in
(13) is 1,1.5 or 2, we use Table 1 in Higgins (2007) to determine the implied values for a
are respectively .4, .35, and .325. Assuming the loss is linex, we immediately have a =
.16. The estimated loss functions for asymmetric power are shown in Figure 1 and the
estimated loss function for linex is shown in Figure 2. The loss functions are plotted over
the range of the forecast errors. Both specifications of the loss function indicate
forecasters attach larger costs to over predicting the inflation rate than to under predicting
the inflation rate by the same magnitude.
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1.6 Conclusions

The MZ regression is a standard procedure for testing forecast unbiasedness and
efficiency. If forecasts are rational, but constructed under asymmetric loss, the MZ
regression may reject both unbiasedness and efficiency. We show that an appropriate test
can be obtained by augmenting the MZ regression with a variable that depends on the
loss function and the time-varying second and possibly higher order moments of the
process being forecasted. We demonstrate that the AMZ regression is easily constructed
for all of the standard loss functions that have been assumed in the literature, including
for example linlin, quadquad and linex. The AMZ regression often requires assuming a
parametric model for the conditional variance, but the appropriateness of the parametric
model can easily be tested from the data. If the conditional variance is assumed to be an
ARCH process, the AMZ regression can be estimated using standard econometric
software. If the loss function depends on a single parameter, the AMZ regression often
provides an estimator of that parameter. We illustrate the use of the AMZ regression by
testing the rationality of inflation forecasts from the Livingston survey. The conventional
MZ regression rejects both unbiasedness and efficiency. Under the assumption of
homogenous loss or linex loss, rationality cannot be rejected with the AMZ regression.
The results indicate that agents view over predicting inflation as more costly than under
predicting inflation.
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Table 1
Augmented Mincer-Zarnowitz Regression for the Livingston U.S. Inflation Forecasts,
June 1954 - December 2003
MZ Regression

Linlin

Linex

0.088**
(0.026)
1.139**
(0.066)

0.012
(0.625)
1.093
(0.067)

0.085
(0.324)
1.09
(0.067)

a2

-0.103
(0.520)

-0.033
(0.179)

-0.28**
(0.075)

-0.16**
(0.046)

d0

0.16
(0.194)
0.2*
(0.111)
0.73**
(0.138)
0.975

0.17
(0.19)
0.2*
(0.11)
0.72**
(0.139)
1.105

0.13
(0.139)
0.22**
(0.110)
0.72**
(0.118)

0.18
(0.167)
0.22**
(0.104)
0.7**
(0.124)

Coefficients

ao
ai

Ct\

P
Wald test
ao=0, ai=l

8.791**

Linlin
(ao=0, ai=l)

Linex
(a0=0, ai=l)

1.134
Jarque-Bera
1.005
1.437
1.009
1.611
3.91
0.93
0.93
1.03
1.12
Q(4)
9.13
3.56
3.17
3.01
3.57
Q(8)
F-statistics are reported for the Wald test and the associated probabilities are in the
parenthesis. ** denotes significance at 5% and * denotes significance at 10%.

Table 2
ARCH LM Test and ARCH-Sup LM Test

ARCH LM
P-value

1
0.45
(0.5)

1.45
(0.23)

20.47**
ARCH Sup LM
17.24**
P-value
(0.0003) (0.0001)
** Denotes significance at 5%

Order
3
1.00
(0.39)

0.71
(0.58)

0.54
(0.74)

20.61** 24.49** 28.53**
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0002)
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1.13
(0.35)
31.36**
(0.0001)

Figure 1
Asymmetric Power Loss Function for U.S. Inflation Forecasts

3

Forecast error
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Figure 2
Linex Loss Function for U.S. Inflation Forecasts
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CHAPTER II

STATE DEPENDENT ASYMMETRIC LOSS

2.1 Introduction

Forecasts for the macro economy are important because they guide the decisions
of individuals, businesses and policy-makers. The purpose of a forecasting exercise is to
predict the future accurately. However, in spite of significant improvement in the
linear/non-linear modeling of time series, forecasters tend to produce biased forecasts.
Among others, Carlson (1977), Urich and Wachtel (1984), Caskey (1985), Zarnowitz
(1985), Frankel and Froot (1987), Croushore (1993, 1997), Jeong and Maddala (1996)
and Souleles (2001) found that forecast reported by professional forecasters are biased. If
we assume forecasters are rational, the above research implies forecasters intentionally
underpredict or overpredict the series being forecasted. This decision depends on the cost
associated with underprediction and overprediction. If the cost of underprediction is
higher than overprediction then agents will tend to overpredict and vice versa.
In essence, whenever agents have asymmetric loss bias is introduced into their
forecasts. Bias due to asymmetric loss in agents' forecasts has been documented in recent
studies by Batchelor and Peel (1998), Ruge (2004), Nobay and Peel (2003), Elliot,
Komunjer and Timmermann (2005, 2008), Capistran (2006). The main idea of these

papers is that when we apply standard tests of rationality, rationality is rejected because
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of bias. But when we allow for asymmetric loss, the forecasts are no longer found to be
irrational.
Recently authors have suggested that agents' loss function not only depends on
the forecast error but also on the state of the economy. Fildes and Stekler (2002)
documented that there is an element of judgment in agents' forecasts implying agents do
not strictly follow formal forecasting models. Using individual level data, Batchelor
(2007) documented the presence of systematic bias in the real GDP forecasts in the G7
economies in the years 1990-2005. He conjectured why individual agents bias their
forecasts. He suggested factors like optimism, pessimism, conservatism and herding are
responsible for the bias. Although several studies have suggested that agents have state
dependent time-varying asymmetric loss, Patton and Timmermann (2007) is the only
study which has presented a formal test. They showed using a set of quantile tests and a
non-parametric test that agents' loss function not only depend on the forecast error but
also on the level of the variable being forecasted. They argued that overprediction of
GDP growth rate is costlier than underprediction especially during episodes of low
growth.
In this paper we introduce time-varying asymmetric loss in a parametric
framework. First we show that under asymmetric loss the time-varying bias can be
explained either by the time-varying asymmetry parameter or by the time-varying higher
order conditional moments or by both. However, in the absence of time-varying higher
order moments, the time-varying bias can only be explained by the time-varying

asymmetry parameter. We model the time-varying asymmetry parameter as a linear
combination of variables that represent the state of the economy. We consider factors
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such as duration of business cycle, uncertainty of forecasts and type of government,
which may cause agents to intentionally bias their forecasts. We show that traditional
efficiency regression can be used to test for time-varying asymmetric loss under linex and
asymmetric power loss. In the empirical analysis, we use one quarter ahead GDP growth
rate forecasts from the SPF to show that state of the economy plays an important role in
agents' forecasting behavior. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we present the
theoretical results. In section 2.3 and 2.4 we describe the data and variables. In section
2.5 we analyze the empirical results. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the paper.

2.2 Theoretical Results

For any observed time series yt, the series in period t + \ can be decomposed as
Vt+i — Mt+i,t + £t+i> where pLt+lt

is the mean in period t+\ conditional on the

information set available in time period t and et+1 is an innovation which has mean zero
and is uncorrelated with elements in the information set. Let yt+lit

be the one period

ahead forecast of yt made using all information available in time period t. For simplicity
we assume a one period horizon but our results can be generalized to any horizon. When
forecasters

have

quadratic

loss

9t+x,t = Mt+i,t- So the forecast error y t + 1 — yt+lt

the

optimal

predictor

is

in time period M-l is nothing but the

innovation. However it is possible that agents give unequal weight to positive and
negative forecast errors. Granger (1969) and Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) showed
that if agents have asymmetry in their loss function then the optimal predictor is the
conditional mean plus a systematic bias
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9t+i,t — Pt+i.t + ^-t+i.t'

where the bias At+lt

depends on the loss function and conditional moments of order two

or higher.
The systematic bias under asymmetric loss has different interpretation. Under
quadratic loss, the forecast errors are uncorrected with information agents use to
forecast. However, under asymmetric loss it is not true. When agents have asymmetric
loss, rational forecast errors may be correlated with variables in agents' information set.
Traditionally the efficiency test is done by the following regression,
yt+i ~ 9t+i,t

= e

t+i

=

^t+i,t + £ t + i

(18)
where A t + l t contains variables in agents' information set. Under quadratic loss A t + U is
zero because forecast errors are uncorrelated with agents' information set so the forecast
error is nothing but the innovation. However, when agents have asymmetric loss A t+11 is
not zero but a function of the loss function parameter and conditional higher order
moments of the series being forecasted. Thus, A t+lt contains variables from agents'
information set. Hence under asymmetric loss we can test the efficiency of agents'
forecasts using the traditional efficiency regression by adding variables from agents'
information set.
Rationality and asymmetric loss have been discussed by Batchelor and Peel
(1998), Elliot, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005, 2008), Capistran (2006) and
Timmermann and Patton (2007). The bias At+11 is a function of the parameters in the loss
function and the conditional moments of the series being forecasted. All the above studies
assumed the parameters in the loss function to be time-invariant and the conditional
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moment parameter to be time-varying. However recent studies by Krane (2003),
Batchelor (2007) and Timmermann and Patton (2007) suggested that the loss function not
only depends on the forecast error but also on the state of the economy. In that case, the
bias in agents' forecasts can be explained either by the time-varying asymmetry parameter
or by time-varying higher order moments or by both. There are many variables in the
survey forecasts, such as GDP growth rate, that do not display time-varying higher order
moment dynamics. In that case the time-varying bias in the forecasts can only be
explained by the time-varying asymmetry parameter. We introduce a time-varying
asymmetry parameter into two commonly used asymmetric loss functions.

2.2.1 LinexLoss

In this section we introduce a time-varying asymmetry parameter into the linex
loss function introduced by Varian (1974). If the asymmetry parameter in the loss
function is time-varying then the linex loss function can be written as
L(yt+i ~ 9t+i,t) = exp{at(yt+1

- yt+i,t)} ~ at(yt+i ~ 9t+i,t) ~ 1

where at can be any real number. When at> 0, and agents underpredict, the loss function
is exponential. It is, however, linear when agents overpredict. On the other hand, if at <
0, the loss is approximately linear for underprediction and approximately exponential for
overprediction. We put a t subscript on a because we assume a as time-varying. We
model a t a s a linear combination of a set of state variables z, so that at = zt'y.

The

purpose of including these variables is to capture the state of the economy and quantify
the parameter of asymmetry through y. Since the costs of overprediction and
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underprediction are different, the optimal prediction under time-varying linex loss will
reflect this bias.
Under conditional normality, the optimal predictor under time-varying linex loss
is,
9t+i,t = Mt+i.t + at+i,tat/2- So the forecast error becomes
2
t+l,t

a

f

,

N .

*t+i = — — 0 tr) + «t+i

=

g t n t g- t + ,

J

£t+1

-

As we can see from the above equation, under linex loss the time-varying bias in the
forecast can be due to the time-varying asymmetry parameter at or due to the conditional
variance crt2+i,t °f the series being forecasted or due to both. In the absence of timevarying higher order moments, the bias can only be explained by the time-varying
asymmetry parameter. As we mentioned in the previous section, empirically it is found
that one quarter ahead GDP growth rate forecasts do not have higher order moment
dynamics. In that case, time-varying variance cannot explain the bias. However, the bias
could only be explained by the time-varying asymmetry parameter at = z'ty. Under
constant variance the forecast error becomes

et+i^^(.z'tY)

+ et+1

= z'tY* + et+i
(19)
Under conditional normality, the maximum likelihood estimator of /* can be
computed by the least squares regression of et+\ on zt. We can estimate the time-varying
bias with the negative of the predictions from this regression Xt+lit = —z'ty*. We can
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estimate the time-varying asymmetry parameter by at = 2lt+1 it/aj, where 8% is the LS
estimator of the variance of st+1 in (19). From the above analysis we see that traditional
efficiency regression can be interpreted as a regression to estimate the time-varying
asymmetric loss parameter.

2.2.2 Asymmetric Power Loss

In this section we introduce a time-varying asymmetry parameter into the
asymmetric power loss function used by Diebold and Christoffersen (1996) and Elliot,
Komunjer and Timmermann (2005). When a is time-varying, the loss function L can be
written as,
L{yt+i,t.at)

= [<*t + (1 ~ 2a t )/(y t +i - 9t+i,t < 0)]|yt+i -9t+i,t\P
(20)

where 0 < at < 1 is the asymmetry parameter and /(.) is the indicator function that takes
the value 1 when the condition in the argument is true. Normally, the power/) is assumed
to be known. The loss function (20) is clearly homogenous of degree p. This family of
loss functions includes many of the loss functions commonly used in the literature. When
at =£0.5 andp = 1, the loss function is asymmetric linlin loss. When at =£ 0.5 and/? = 2
the loss function is asymmetric quadquad. When at= 0.5 and/? = 1, the loss function is
the standard symmetric linear loss function and for/> = 2 the loss function is the standard
symmetric quadratic loss function. Because the asymmetry parameter is required to be in

the interval (0, 1), we assume at = <t>(z'ty), where $(.) is the standard normal
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cumulative distribution function and zt are again state variables. For general asymmetric
power loss function with a time-varying asymmetry parameter, the optimal predictor is
9t+i,t = A*t+i,t + * _ 1 ( « t ) ^

Under a conditional normal distribution, for a given p and at, the parameter
a>t = a)(a t ,p) satisfies the equation

(1 - at) £ > - <*t\v-^(z)dz - at Qz - ^~^{z)dz

=0
(21)

where 0(z) is the standard normal density [see Diebold and Christoffersen (1996)]. In the
absence of time-varying standard deviation the time-varying bias can only be explained
by the asymmetry parameter at.
Like linex loss, the estimation of the time-varying asymmetry parameter and bias
under general asymmetric power loss can be done by the method of maximum likelihood.
Under constant standard deviation and time-varying asymmetry parameter, the forecast
error becomes
et+1 = -w(a t> p)t7 + e t+1 .
The normal log-likelihood function for the entire sample can be written as
W(y.o) = - 2 l o g( 2 7 0 - 2 l o g ( f f ) ~ 2

V2

where &)(<J>(z'ty),p) can be solved from (21). Given the MLE's of y and a, we can
estimate the time-varying asymmetry parameter by at = o ( z t y). The time-varying bias
Xt+11 = 4>(2t, p)d can be computed in each time period from (21).
Now let us consider a specific loss function in this general class. When at ^0:5
and p = 1 the loss function becomes asymmetric linlin. Assuming conditional normality,
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the optimal predictor under linlin loss in the absence of time-varying standard deviation
is Vt+u = <^~\at)a. Solving for yt+lt

yields

9t+i,t =Ht+i,t + 4>~1(at)e

Because we assume dt = <J>(z\y) to insure that at 6 (0, 1), the forecast error becomes
e t+1 = -oz'tY + st+1
= z't? + £t+i

(22)
In this case maximum likelihood estimation is equivalent to linear regression. Thus,
similar to the linex case under conditional normality, we can estimate the parameters in
the loss function by linear regression. We can estimate the time-varying bias with the
negative of the predictions from this regression Xt+lit = -z'ty. We can estimate the timevarying asymmetry parameter with at = *(At+i,t)/^£2» where a£ is the LS estimator of the
standard deviation of st+1 in (22). From the above exercise we can see that traditional
efficiency regression can be interpreted as testing for either asymmetric linex or linlin
loss. The regressions are observationally equivalent. The only difference lies in the
2

parameterizations y* = - — and y = —ay.

2.3 Survey of Professional Forecasters

We obtain the one quarter ahead GDP growth rate forecasts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF). Starting with the first quarter of 1968, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has been conducting surveys of forecasts of several
important economic variables produced by private sector economists. These forecasted
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variables include output, inflation, and interest rates. It is important that anonymity of the
forecasters be maintained here so that the economists cannot be held liable for inaccurate
forecasts and neither can they claim credit for accurate forecasts. Croushore (1993)
provides a very detailed description. This survey was initially conducted by the American
Statistical Association, together with the National Bureau of Economic Research, starting
with the fourth quarter of 1968. In the early days of the survey there were 50 participants
in each quarter. However, the number of respondents reduced to 20 later. In the third
quarter of 1981, the scope of the survey was expanded to also include forecasts of one
quarter ahead GDP growth rate, the 3-month T-bill rates and the rate of inflation. The
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia revived the survey in 1990 after it was
discontinued by the ASA and the NBER. For the purpose of this study, the sample period
begins with the third quarter of 1981 and closes with the fourth quarter of 2007.

2.4 Data and Variables that Can Explain Bias

In this section we propose variables that explain why agents knowingly introduce
bias into their forecasts. There can be many reasons why agents report different forecasts
from what their econometric model actually produce. Batchelor (2007) suggested few
subjective factors that can explain the bias in agents' forecasts. These are optimism,
pessimism and conservatism. Batchelor and Dua (1990) suggested that forecasters find it
beneficial to develop a reputation as optimists or pessimists. Findings by McNicholas and

O'Brien (1997), Butler and Lang (1991), Francis, Hanna and Philbrick (1997), Francis
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and Philbrick (1993), Lim (2001) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) are similar in
this line.
In the literature authors have suggested that agents want to account for recoveries
and downturns in the economy when they forecast as these are important events.
Forecasters usually do not want to miss these important events while forecasting because
it is a matter of reputation for them. They may intentionally bias their forecasts
depending on whether the economy is in expansion or contraction [see Loungni and
Trehan (2002), Zarnowitz and Braun (1992)]. We test whether expansion/contraction in
the economy can cause bias in agents' forecasts by using a expansion/contraction dummy
(RECDM) in our regression. In addition to the current phase of the business cycle,
duration of the current phase may also cause bias. As the length of the expansion
becomes longer agents may become increasingly optimistic and bias their forecasts
upward. Similarly, as the length of a contraction becomes longer, agents may become
increasingly pessimistic and bias their forecast downward. So we include duration
(DURATION) measured as the number of quarters since the last turning point as a
variable in our regression. We also include an interaction between recession and
DURATION (RECDUR) to allow duration to have an asymmetric effect during
expansion and contraction.
The dummy variables for recession and the duration of business cycle are
constructed from the NBER's recession dating procedure. The NBER's business cycle
dating committee maintains a chronology of the U.S business cycles. According to the
NBER, recession is not a decline in real GDP for two consecutive quarters but a
significant decline in economic activity lasting more than few months. According to the

33

NBER, the indicator of recession is not only decline in real GDP but also a decline in real
income, employment, industrial productivity and wholesale-retail-sales. According to the
NBER dating committee the period from a peak to a trough is a recession and the period
from a trough to a peak is an expansion. Our dummy variable takes the value 1 if the
economy is experiencing a recession and zero otherwise. The duration of business cycle
is a count variable. Suppose the economy is going from a trough to a peak then the count
variable takes the value 1 right after the trough and keeps increasing till it reaches a peak.
That is the duration of expansion. We follow similar rules for calculating the duration of
contraction as well.
Sometimes forecasters have preference for the incumbent government as
suggested by Ulan, Dewald and Bullard (1995). There is a large literature that documents
the difference in political parties and inflation/output outcome in the economy [see
Alesina et al. (1993), Hibbs (1977, 1986) and Snowbergs, Wolfers and Zitewitz (2007)].
The former studies suggest that a democratic party is good for stimulating growth and the
later study suggest that a Republican party is good for business so agents will be more
optimistic if a Republican is in office. Hence the political party in office might explain
the bias so we have a political party dummy (POLIDM) variable. The dummy variable
for type of government takes the value 1 if a Republican is in office and zero otherwise.
In addition to the above mentioned variables we suggest uncertainty may affect
agents' bias. Fildes and Stekler (2002) mentioned from the perspective of bias in agents'
forecast that uncertainty is important. When there is uncertainty the bias can be upward
or downward. It is also important to see if uncertainty has an asymmetric effect on agents'
forecast depending on the state of the economy. When there is expansion and there is lack
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of consensus among forecasters, agents may want to build a reputation as optimist or
pessimist. So they may bias their forecast upward or downward. Similarly in the presence
of recession, uncertainty may or may not have any asymmetric effect in agents forecast.
So we include uncertainty (UNCERT) and an interaction between RECDM and
UNCERT (RECUNCER) as state variables in our analysis. Uncertainty is calculated as
the standard deviation of individual level one quarter ahead GDP growth rate forecasts
for a given time period. The GDP growth rate uncertainty is calculated from the
individual level data from the SPF.

2.5 Empirical Results

We begin our empirical analysis by testing for time-varying second order
moments in the forecast error of GDP growth rate. We conduct an ARCH-LM test up to
lag 5 and fail to reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH. To check if linex and linlin loss
have time-varying second order moments we estimate a GARCH(1,1)-M model for both
the loss functions. If a is time-invariant then we can test for the significance of timevarying second order moments in linex loss by including the variance of the forecast error
in GARCH(1,1) conditional mean specification. Similarly in case of linlin, when a is
time-invariant we can test the significance of the time-varying second order moments by
including the standard deviation of the forecast error in the GARCH(1,1) conditional
mean specification. For both linex and linlin we do not find the coefficient of the
conditional variance/standard deviation in the GARCH(1,1) conditional mean equation to
be significant. Also in the conditional variance equation we find the coefficient of the
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lagged squared error to be insignificant. The above tests confirm that GDP growth rate
has no time-varying higher order moments.
We begin by estimating a general model with all variables and all possible
interaction terms in it except for an interaction between RECDM and POLIDM. We can
not include this interaction in our analysis because this variable is perfectly correlated
with RECDM. In our sample there are three brief periods of recession and during these
periods Republicans were in office. We do not have observations to test for the impact of
recession under a Democratic government. We present the results in Table 3. In the first
column of Table 3 we present the general result for linex and linlin loss. We find the
coefficient of the intercept and the coefficient of RECDM to be insignificant. Even
though it is argued in the literature that agents bias their forecast during expansion and
contraction our results suggest that agents do not bias their forecast during expansion or
contraction. We also find the coefficients of DURATION and RECDUR to be
insignificant. This indicates that there is no optimism nor pessimism that accumulates as
the current phase of the business cycle continues. We also find the coefficient of
POLIDM to be insignificant. Agents do not appear to be optimistic or pessimistic based
on which party is in office.
The coefficients on UNCERT and RECUNCER are significant. The sign of the
coefficient on UNCERT is negative and the sign of the coefficient on RECUNCER is
positive. Furthermore, the coefficient on UNCERT is less in absolute value than the
coefficient on RECUNCER. This implies that when the economy is in recession,
increasing uncertainty causes forecasters to introduce a positive bias, whereas, when the
economy is in expansion, increasing uncertainty causes forecasters to introduce a
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negative bias. Uncertainty causes forecasters to take a conservative approach. As
uncertainty increases, forecasters bias the forecast towards its historical average. Unlike
the finding by McNees (1976, 1988, 1992), McNees and Reis (1983) and Zarnowitz
(1992) that during recession agents overpredict, our results suggest that in the presence of
recession, increasing uncertainty cause agents to overpredict.
To simplify the model, we sequentially remove the least significant variables and
re-estimate the model. When we exclude all insignificant variables the variables that
remain significant are UNCERT and RECUNCER. We present our final model under
linex and linlin loss in the second column of Table 3. We follow the same steps for
quadquad loss and get similar results. The general model that we estimate under
quadquad loss is presented in the third column of Table 3. Like linex and linlin case,
under quadquad loss UNCERT and RECUNCER are significant in the general model
and in the final model under quadquad loss both these variables remain significant. The
final model for quadquad loss is presented in the fourth column. This means irrespective
of the functional form of the loss function we find UNCERT to be negative and
significant and RECUNCER to be positive and significant. For both linex/linlin and
quadquad we present the SIC criteria. In both the cases the SIC is minimized in case of
the final model. So the final model is our best model. To estimate our models we assume
normality. To test for normality, we present the Jarque-Bera statistics. For all models the
Jarque-Bera statistics are insignificant which means normality assumption is appropriate.
Q-statistics of order 4 and 8 are computed with the residuals and squared residuals. The
statistics are insignificant for all models which suggest that our models are properly
specified.
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In Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 we plot the time-varying asymmetry parameter and
the time-varying bias for linex, linlin and quadquad loss. Notice, the pattern of variation
of the time-varying bias is almost same for all three loss functions. For linex and linlin
the time-varying bias is a multiple of at. In linex the tme-varying bias is z'tya2 -2 and for
linlin it is z'tya. We find the time-varying bias does not depend upon the specification of
the loss function. This implies our estimation is robust with respect to any of these three
loss functions. As we can see the plots of the time-varying bias, there are three peaks that
correspond to three brief periods of recession over the last two decades. During early 80s
recession the bias was about 5% whereas during early 90s and 2000 recessions the bias
was a little below 2%. These are the time periods when agents overpredicted GDP growth
rate due to uncertainty. In all other time periods the bias was about - 1 % .

2.6 Conclusions

Although there have been important advances in time series modeling, agents still
produce biased forecasts. Agents do not rely on econometric modeling completely but
use their judgment to some extent and this element of judgment reflects the state of the
economy. In this paper we explain why agents knowingly introduce bias into their
forecasts. We use one quarter ahead GDP growth rate forecasts from the SPF to answer
this question. Many authors suggested that agents' loss function depend on the forecast
error and the state of the economy. Under asymmetric loss the time-varying bias can be
explained by either a time-varying asymmetry parameter or by time-varying higher order
moments or by both. However, in the absence of time-varying higher order moments the
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time-varying bias can only be due to the time-varying asymmetry parameter. Since GDP
growth rate has no time-varying higher order moments so the time-varying bias can only
be explained by the time-varying asymmetry parameter. To quantify the time-varying
asymmetry parameter and the time-varying bias in the time-varying asymmetric loss we
introduce time-varying loss explicitly into a parametric model. We model the timevarying asymmetry parameter as a linear combination of different state variables. For the
empirical analysis we use linex and asymmetric power loss. Using these loss functions
we estimate the time-varying bias and the asymmetry parameter by maximum likelihood
estimation. The factors that are responsible for agents' biased forecasts are uncertainty of
forecasts and uncertainty in the presence of recession.
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Table 3
Determinants of Time-varying Asymmetry Parameter in the One Quarter Ahead GDP
Growth Rate, 1981:3-2007:4
Linex/Linlin Loss

Quadquad Loss

Variables

General

Final

General

Final

Intercept

-0.49
(0.78)

-0.03
(0.36)

-0.37
(0.52)

-0.07
(0.27)

RECDM

1.27
(1.50)

0.69
(1.28)

POLIDM

0.61
(0.46)

0.52
(0.38)

UNCERT

-0.63**
(0.33)

-0.57**
(0.29)

-0.49**
(0.24)

-0.39**
(0.19)

DURATION

0.006
(0.02)

RECJJNCER

3.43**
(1.79)

REC_DUR

-1.61
(1.30)

Adj Rsq

0.21

0.20

0.16

0.16

SIC

4.43

4.30

0.37

0.20

0(4)

0.161

0.123

0.209

0.140

Q(8)

0.443

0.264

0.398

0.179

Q 2 (4)

0.899

0.852

0.650

0.407

Q 2 (8)

0.950

0.676

0.784

0.143

Jarque-Bera

0.499

0.854

0.395

0.379

0.003
(0.01)
1.70**
(0.40)

2.21**
(0.63)

I 19**
(0.23)

-0.91
(0.58)

Standard errors are in parenthesis. ** denotes significant at 5% level and * denotes
significant at 10% level. For residuals, squared residuals and normality test p-values are
given.
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Figure 3
Time-varying Asymmetry Parameter for Linex Loss
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Figure 4
Time-varying Bias for Linex Loss
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Figure 5
Time-varying Asymmetry Parameter for Linlin Loss
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Figure 6
Time-varying Bias for Linlin Loss
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Figure 7
Time-varying Asymmetry Parameter for Quadquad Loss
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Figure 8
Time-varying Bias for Quadquad Loss
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CHAPTER III

DO AGENTS LEARN BY LEAST SQUARES? THE EVIDENCE
PROVIDED BY CHANGES IN MONETARY POLICY
3.1 Introduction

The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) assumes that agents acquire and
process information rationally. When agents have complete knowledge of the structure of
the model, forecast errors have mean zero, constant variance and no serial correlation.
Empirical tests based on surveys of expectations often reject the REH. Among others,
Carlson (1977), Urich and Wachtel (1984), Caskey (1985), Zarnowitz (1985), Frankel
and Froot (1987), Croushore (1993, 1997), Jeong and Maddala (1996) and Souleles
(2001) all rejected the REH. The REH is rejected in the above studies because survey
forecast errors are serially correlated. This implies that the forecasts are not efficient in
that they omit relevant information available to forecasters.
Due to the accumulated evidence rejecting the REH, researchers have proposed
that agents may not have access to all information about the structure of the economy but
that they learn about it over time. This assumption is referred to as "adaptive learning".
Agents behave like econometricians when making forecasts and adjust their forecast rule
as new data becomes available over time. When agents estimate parameters by least
squares using the available data, it is known as "least squares learning". Early studies

such as Lucas (1978), Grandmont (1985) and Woodford (1991) demonstrated the stability
of steady states under least squares learning. Convergence of least squares learning to
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rational expectation (RE) equilibrium in linear models was proved by Bray (1982), Bray
and Savin (1986), Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989a, 1989b), Evans and Honkapohja
(1994a) and in nonlinear models the convergence was shown by Fuchs (1979),
Grandmont (1985) Grandmont and Laroque (1991), Margaritis (1987) and Evans and
Honkapohja (1994b). The key idea of these papers that RE is not necessary to achieve
market clearing conditions. It can be achieved by implementing least squares learning
rules. An excellent survey of the adaptive learning literature is provided by Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
More recent research focuses on the design and stability of monetary policy in the
presence of least squares learning by private agents. Evans and Honkapohja (2001,
2003a, 2003b, 2006); MacGough, Rudebusch, and Williams (2005); and Preston (2006)
showed the stability of Taylor style rules in different stylized macro models when agents
use linear forecasting rules to form expectations. These studies also show that monetary
policy under least squares learning converges to a rational expectation equilibrium under
certain conditions. Preston (2006) showed that policy makers will be efficient in setting
policies if they have more information about the determinants of agents' expectation.
Orphanides and Williams (2003, 2004, and 2005) showed that policies that would be
efficient under RE can perform poorly when agents are learning. Bullard and Cho (2005)
showed that in a macroeconomic system where monetary authority employs a Taylortype rule it is possible to avoid liquidity trap episodes under certain conditions. Bullard
and Eusepi (2005) considered an economy where agents use adaptive learning to form

expectations and the monetary policymaker is committed to using a Taylor-type policy
rule. They showed that the observed increase in inflation during the 1970s can be
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attributed to the unexpected change in the trend productivity growth rate under learning.
In most cases the above-mentioned studies use simulation and calibration to show their
results.
Although there is a growing number of studies that use least squares learning in
theoretical macro models, there are practically no studies that conduct empirical tests of
whether agents show learning behavior. The one exception is Branch and Evans (2006)
who compared the performance of alternative recursive forecasting models for inflation
and output growth. Their study used different models and estimation techniques to mimic
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). They found evidence that a forecasting
model which implements a constant gain learning algorithm best fits the SPF. Their study
conducts an indirect test of whether agents show learning behavior by using different
learning algorithms to try and reproduce the SPFs' forecasts.
In this study, we conduct a formal direct test of whether agents' forecasts of the 3month Treasury bill rate are consistent with least squares learning when there are changes
in monetary policy. We specifically examine the one quarter ahead mean and median 3month Treasury bill forecasts from the SPF. We first derive the theoretical conditional
mean, variance and autocovariances of the forecast error of the short term interest rate
from the SPFs assuming there are discrete shifts in policy and least squares learning. We
show that when the optimal weights associated with the parameters of the forecasting
model changes due to structural shifts, under least squares learning the forecast error will
not have zero mean and constant variance. Then we apply the Bai and Perron (1998,

2001, and 2003) test to identify the number and dates of the breaks in a Taylor rule and in
the optimal weights for the information set of the short term interest rate forecasting
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model. Next we estimates the optimal weights for agents information set in each policy
regime and empirically estimate the conditional mean and variance of the short term
interest rate forecast error. Then we standardize the mean and median forecast error from
the SPFs with the estimated mean and variance. Finally we test the standardized residuals
for serial correlation. If agents have same variables in their information set that we have
and use least squares learning then standardizing their forecast error will give residuals
which will produce zero mean and constant variance. Our result shows that the
standardized residuals are serially uncorrelated.
The paper proceeds as follows. Theoretical results and an econometric
methodology are discussed in section 3.2, section 3.3 describes data, specification of the
Taylor rule and an interest rate forecasting model, empirical results are discussed in
section 3.4 and finally section 3.5 concludes.

3.2 Theoretical Results

We assume agents construct their forecasts based on the model,
yt = xtp + ut

ut~IID(0,a2)
(23)

where yt is a scalar of observed dependent variable at time t. The p x 1 vector x, contains
conditioning variables known to agents at time t-\ and are used to forecast yt. The
conditioning variables include lagged values of y, itself. If agents are rational, (23)
represents the reduced form equation for and is derived from the structural model that
describes how yt is actually generated in the economy. Assuming rationality /? contains
the true reduced form parameters. If agents are not rational, then (23) is simply the
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forecasting model used by agent, where xt contains the variables in their information set
and ft contains the optimal weights in the projection of yt on xt. If agents are rational, the
properties of their forecast errors are very easy to derive. Under rationality, agents know
the reduced form model (23). The forecast in period / + 1 is Vt+1 = x't+1p and the forecast
error is vt*+1 = y t+1 -yt*+1 = ut+1.

Therefore the mean, the variance and the

autocovariances of the observed forecast errors, conditioned on the past information are
E(v*t+1\0t) = E(ut+1\<Pt) = O
var(vt+1\<Pt) = var(ut+1\4>t) = a2
and
cov(v*s, v*k) = cov(us,uk) = 0
for s ¥= k. where <Pt is the information set at time t. Under rationality, the forecast error is
identical to the reduced form error and inherits its properties. The one period forecast
errors should have mean zero and be serially uncorrelated. If the mean is not zero, there is
a systematic bias in the forecast. If the forecast errors are serially correlated, the forecasts
are not efficient and omit relevant information contained in the information set. A
violation of either condition contradicts the assumption rationality. As described in the
previous section, test biased on surveys of forecast often reject rationality because
forecast errors are serially correlated.

3.2.1 Properties of Forecast Error under Least Squares Learning

Next we consider the properties of forecast errors under least squares learning.
Let Xt = (xlt ...,xt)' be at*p matrix containing the conditioning variables starting at the
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beginning of the sample and running through time period t. Under least squares learning,
the forecast in period t + 1 is

where

bt = bt.t + [(x'-iyx'-^xtbt - xibt.j/ft
is the recursive least squares estimate of/? using data through time period t and
/ t = l + *i[(X t - 1 )'^- 1 ]- 1 x t
The mean, variance and autocovariance of the recursive least squares forecast errors
conditioned on the past information are, [see, for example, Harvey (1990)],
E(vt+1\0t)

= E(x't+1B + u t + 1 - x't+1bt)

= x't+1(fi-E(bt))
var(v*t+1\0t) = a2[l +

=0
x't+1[iXt)'Xt]-1xt+1]

and
cov(vk,vs)

=0

for k ± s In a stable structural environment, the assumption of least squares learning has
little empirical content to distinguish it from an assumption of RE. If agents learn by least
squares, the forecast errors still have a zero mean and zero covariances. The only
distinction under learning is that the forecast error variance becomes heteroscedastic. The
variance of the forecast error under least squares learning has two components. The first
component is due to the variance of the error in the DGP and the other component is due
to the parameter uncertainty. Although the conditional variance is heteroscedastic, if the
structure of the economy remains the same, as the forecaster obtains more data over time
the parameter uncertainty disappears because
lim var (vt+1 |* t ) = limff2[l + ^ + 1 [(X t )'X t ]- 1 x t + 1 ]
t->00

t-»00
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= <T + lim

a1 ,

—Xf,-,

-,-1

rl

*t+i =

ff2

If the economy is stable and the forecaster has a large amount of data, the
observed forecast error will have the same properties as rational forecast errors. In such a
scenario, it is difficult to test for the presence of learning.
3.2.2 Properties of Forecast Error under Least Squares Learning in the Presence
of Structural Breaks
For least squares learning to be empirically identified, there must be structural
change in the economy. In the post-war period of U.S. history, there is ample evidence of
structural shifts not only in monetary policy but also in other important macroeconomic
relationships. The structural breaks are in time periods T\, ..., Tm. The forecast model (23)
can be written in the matrix form as
Yi=Xipi + Ui

i = l,

m
(24)

where Y, is a vector containing the variable to be forecasted in regime i, X\ is a
(7/+i-l-7/)x/7 matrix of conditioning variables, ft is a vector of optimal weights in
regime i and £/, is the vector of forecast errors with mean vector 0 and variancecovariance matrix oflTi+x„x-Ti.

Each regime has 7}+i-l-7/ observations. The coefficient

vectors ft and the error variances of are allowed to vary across regimes.
We now derive the properties of the forecast errors under least squares learning
when there are regime shifts as described in (24). The forecast error in period 7}+ s + 1 is
v

Tj+s+l

=

VTj+S+l ~

VTj+S+l

(25)
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VTJ+S+I

—

X

'TJ+S+I

[Pj ~~ bTj+s+i) + Ufj+s+i
(26)

where period Tj + s + I denotes the (s + l)th observation in period 7} . When there are
regime shifts, we can show that

bTj+s+1 = [(xTj+syxTj+'Y^x'tW

+x'iui)

and therefore,

r

r +s

7-1

E(bTJ+s+1)=[(* o'* ' n£(*w<)
We see that E(bTm+s) depends on all previous values of the conditioning variables
and is a matrix weighted average of the coefficients ft in the current and all previous
regimes. Using the expression for E(bT

+s)

in (26), we can show that

E (vTj+s+i K + s ) = liZl x'Tj+s+1 [(^ + s ) V/ + s ] _ 1 (X'tXt)iPi ~ A)
(27)
When there are structural shifts under least squares learning, forecast error no
longer have zero mean. The mean of the forecast error is a function of all the
conditioning variables through time Tj + s and the difference between the parameters in
the current regime and the past regimes. When there are no structural shifts so that /?,- = ft
for all /, the bias vanishes and the forecast errors have zero mean. The variance of the
forecast error in period 7} + S + 1 is
var (vTj+s+1

\&Tj+s)

= E (uTj+s+1

-

x'Tj+s+1

{{XT>^)'XT^

(XTJ+')'uTtf

(28)
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where ITJ+S is a block diagonal variance-covariance matrix of 7} + s observations. The
first j - 1 blocks have Ti+i - I - Tt elements a? for i = 1,...,/ - 1 and the last block has s
elements of of. The variance is same within the block but varies across blocks due to
varying regimes. Similarly variance of the forecast error is heteroscedastic. The variance
of the forecast error does not depend on the fa's but does depend on the variance of the
error in each of m regimes. If structural breaks are present to continue in the future, the
heteroscedasticity does not disappear as the sample increases. If the error variances are
the same across regimes of = ••• = a^, the variance of the forecast error in (28) reduces
to the conventional formula for the variance of the recursive residual. We also derive the
autocovariances of the forecast error. Consider the forecast error in any two periods
v ri+fc and vT+s,

where Tt + k <Tj + s. Note that Tt + k and Tj + s may be in the same

regime where 7) = 7} or may be in different regimes where T, < Tj.
The autocovariance is
cov(vTi+klvT.+s)

= E[(uTi+k-

*v4(*ri+fc~1)'*T'+ft~TV'+fc_1)'tf7''+fc~1)

(uTj+s - x'Tj+s {(XTJ+S-1)'XTJ+S-1Y1

(X^-^'U7^-1)]

= -E [uTt+k(U*J+*-*)'xT>+>-i { ( X V * - 1 ) V V * - 1 } " 1 xTj+s
+E x'T.+k {(XTi+k-1)'xTi+k-1}~1

(xTi+k-1)'uTi+k-1(UTJ+k-1)XTi+s-1

{(x T > +s - 1 )'x 7 v«- 1 }" 1 * 7V+s = o .
(29)
Although the expressions for the mean and variance of the forecast error change when
there is least squares learning and the model has structural shifts, in the absence of

52

structural shifts it reduce down to the standard results under least square learning. The
covariance, when there are structural shifts, is 0 if the forecast errors are bias corrected
otherwise the bias in the forecast error will show up as serial correlation in the
autocovariance. Least squares learning with structural shifts give a clear idea about how
and why forecast errors have non-zero mean and heteroscedastic variance.
The preceding results provide a method of testing whether observed forecast
errors are consistent with least squares learning. Although agents may not be aware of
structural breaks when they occur, we can identify them ex-post with a sufficient amount
of data. We can then estimate optimal weights f}t and the error variances of in (28) in
each regime by least squares using data over the entire sample period. The estimates of
the Pi and the of can be substituted into (27) and (28). Let the estimator of £'(v t |O t _ 1 )
given in (27) be mt and the estimator of var(yt\cD^)

given in (28) be ft. Then for each

t we can standardize the forecast error,

St = (vt - mt)/J/t
and construct a Q - Statistic,
v
i=l

where ff is the ith autocorrelation coefficient of 8 t. The &s will be distributed as x2
with p degree of freedom where p is the number of regressors in the model. If agents do
least squares learning then the autocorrelation function of Q^s should be iid.
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3.3 The Taylor Rule and an Interest Rate Forecasting Model

3.3.1 Specification of the Models

We use the short term interest rate forecasting model to test whether agents learn
by least squares. The mean and median one quarter ahead short term interest rate
forecasts are used from the SPFs to conduct the above test. It is a known fact that the U.S.
economy has passed through infrequent structural shifts in its post war history. Bai and
Perron (1998, 2001, and 2003) provide a test that identifies number and dates of multiple
structural breaks in a linear model. Thus we apply the Bai and Perron test to both the
Taylor rule and the information set of the interest rate forecasting model to identify the
number of breaks and break dates in the policy rule. We do this to match up the break
dates of the Taylor rule and the information set of the short term interest rate forecasting
model. Given that Fed rate and short term interest rates are highly correlated, it is very
likely that the break dates in the policy rule and the break dates in the interest rate
forecasting model coincide. The break dates that we find in the policy rule and in the
interest rate model are very similar.
Our theoretical results suggest that the bias of the forecast errors when there is
least squares learning and structural break depend on the fas in (27) which means that
when there are structural shifts in the policy rule, variables are assigned different weights
in different regimes. When SPFs forecast the short term interest rate in real time they do

not observe these shifts and they cannot incorporate these shifts while forecasting short
term interest rate. Thus their forecast errors are biased. However, ex-post we observe
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these break dates. So we use all the data and estimate those optimal weights (fts) in
different regimes. Since ex-post these shift dates are observed, we incorporate those
break dates and forecast short term interest rate. However the forecasting model is not
meant to forecast short term interest rate but to estimate the bias and variance in the
forecast error. Then we standardize the SPFs short term interest rate forecast errors with
the estimated mean and variance of the forecast error. If the information set is properly
specified (i.e. what SPFs use to forecast short term rate) then the standardized residuals
should be iid. This result demonstrates least squares learning behavior.
Over the last few decades the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) has attracted increased
attention. A typical Taylor rule is specified as follows,
rt = nt + rt* + ayyt

+ an (nt - 2) + ar rt_x

where rt is the Federal funds rate, nt is the four quarter moving average GDP deflator, rt*
is the equilibrium interest rate, yt is output gap, 2% is the target inflation rate and rt_x is
one period lagged Fed funds rate. The Taylor rule recommends a setting for the level of
nominal Federal funds rate that depends on four factors. The first factor is the current
inflation rate. The second factor is the equilibrium real interest rate. Both these factor
added together to provide the benchmark nominal federal funds rate. The benchmark
Federal funds rate (the sum of first and second factor) raises one to one with the current
inflation rate. If the current inflation rate is high, it recommends a high benchmark rate as
well keeping everything else constant. The use of an equilibrium real interest rate
emphasizes the importance of real interest rate in formulating monetary policy. More

precisely the rule says that the real interest rate will be increased above equilibrium if the
inflation is above it's target or the real GDP is above it's potential. The third factor is an
inflation gap adjustment based on the difference between the inflation rate and a given
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target for inflation. The target inflation rate is taken as 2%. This factor recommends
raising the Federal funds rate above the benchmark rate if inflation is above its target rate
and vice versa. The inflation gap adjustment also captures the long-run goal of the
Central Bank. The fourth factor is an output gap adjustment based on the difference
between real GDP and potential real GDP. The Fed funds rate is raised above the
benchmark rate if real GDP is above potential real GDP and vice versa. The output gap
adjustment also captures the short-run goal. Although monetary policy rule can be
characterized by small number of variables such as inflation gap and output gap, it can't
capture the complexities of policy process. Many variants of the Taylor rule have been
estimated in the literature. A key finding is that a lagged value of interest rate is highly
significant in the estimated policy rule. Examples are Sack (1998), Amato and Laubach
(1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002), Rudebusch (2002) English, Nelson and Sack
(2003). In addition to policy inertia it also captures serially correlated errors which could
reflect various episodic factors from the Taylor rule (Rudebusch 2002). Further English,
Nelson and Sack (2003) have shown that even after allowing for serially correlated errors
the lagged interest rate in the policy rule remains significant and plays an important role
in the dynamics of the short term interest rate.
We also need to specify information set that might plausibly represent what the
SPF use to forecast the short term interest rate. Agents are well aware of the Federal
Reserve's two legislated goals: price stability and full employment stated in the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act 1978. Keeping the Federal Reserve mandate in

mind it is reasonable to assume that agents will use the output gap and the inflation gap
variable to forecast the short term interest rate. Thus, we have included the output gap
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and inflation gap variables in the information set of our forecasting model. We also have
lagged short term interest rate in our information set. As mentioned above lagged short
term rate has both theoretical and empirical significance. So it is reasonable to assume
that agents use lagged short term rate to forecast future short term rate. Agents may also
use information that is not explicitly in the Taylor rule. An example would be the slope of
the yield curve. The rational expectation theory of the term structure says that the long
term rate is the average of the expected future short term rates. If the spread between the
long term rate and short term rate is positive then the market expects the short term rate
to go up in the future. Early studies by Fama (1984), Hardouvelis (1988), Mishkin (1988)
and Cambell and Shiller (1983, 1991) found that the yield spread between short term and
long term rates do help to forecast the change in the short term rate. More recent studies,
such as Ahrens (2002), Ang, Piazessi and Wei (2006), Feroli (2004), Bernake (2006)
Estrella (2005a, 2005b), confirmed that the slope or the term structure has a positive
relationship with the future short term interest rate. Business economists are very aware
of the rational expectation theory of the term structure and its empirical support.
Therefore we include lagged six month Treasury bill rates in the information set.

3.3.2 Data

The one quarter ahead mean and median forecasts of the 3-month Treasury bill
rate were obtained from the SPF. Every three months, starting first quarter of 1968, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia takes a survey of forecasts, prepared by private
sector economists of twenty or more economic variables, including output, inflation, and
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interest rates. The respondents are professional forecasters who produce regular forecasts
of economic variables. One important feature of the Survey of Professional Forecasters is
anonymity of the forecasters. Anonymity is important because forecasters can't claim
credit for good forecasts, nor can they be held responsible for bad forecasts. For details
see Crousher (1993). The American Statistical Association together with National Bureau
of Economic Research began conducting the survey in fourth quarter of 1968. Initially
there were 50 participants in each quarter in its early days but later on the number
reduced down to 20. By 1990 the ASA and the NBER decided to discontinue the Survey.
Later on in 1990 the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia revived the survey by inviting
participants. In the third quarter of 1981, the survey was expanded to include one quarter
ahead forecasts of the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Our sample for the analysis of the
survey forecasts error will therefore start in the third quarter of 1981.
The Federal funds rate, 3-month Treasury bill rate (secondary market rate), 6month Treasury bill rate and the GDP deflator have been obtained from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. There are various measures of output gap used in estimated policy
rules. Taylor (1993) fitted a log linear trend to real GDP to measure potential GDP. In
some studies, a quadratic trend is fitted for the potenial GDP measure [Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1997a, 1997b)]. OECD measure of potential GDP [De Masi (1997)] and the IMF
measure of potential GDP are used in other studies. However, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) measure of potential GDP is most common in the policy rule literature
[Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)]. For our analysis we use
Congressional Budget Office measure of potential GDP. The CBO measure of potential
GDP is not a simple fitted GDP trend, but is estimated in terms of a relationship with
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future inflation similar to the way a time-varying NAIRU is estimated within the context
of a Philips curve (Rudebusch 1998). The output gap is calculated by taking the log
difference of real GDP and potential GDP, multiplied by 100. The 3-month Treasury bill
and 6-month Treasury bill are converted from a monthly annualized to a quarterly
annualized rate. The four-quarter moving average of the annualized price inflation of
GDP deflator is used.
We estimate the Taylor rule and the Treasury bill forecasting rule using quarterly
data that starts in the first quarter of 1960 and ends in the first quarter of 2007. The
information set for the Taylor rule has a constant, lagged Fed rate, price inflation of GDP
deflator minus the target GDP deflator (taken as 2%) and output gap. The information set
for the 3-month Treasury bill forecasts has a constant, lagged 3-month Treasury bill rates,
lagged 6-month Treasury bill rates, lagged output gaps and lagged price inflation of GDP
deflator gaps. Although we have data since 1960 for the variables in our information set,
the mean and median 3-month Treasury bill survey forecasts are observed only since
third quarter of 1981. The survey forecast error can only be constructed since 1981.
However, to estimate the mean and variance of the forecast error since 1981, we need all
the data back from 1960 because the bias depends on the parameter estimates of past
regimes (27) and the variance depends on the variance of past regimes (28).
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3.4 Empirical Results

3.4.1 Structural Change Tests Results

First we test for multiple regime shifts in the Taylor rule and in the information
set of the short term interest rate. In order to identify the number of breaks and the break
dates we apply the Bai and Perron (1998, 2001, and 2003) test for structural change to the
Taylor rule and the forecast model for 3-month Treasury bill rate. The Bai and Perron test
is nice because it explicitly treats the breakpoints as unknown, and estimates of the
breakpoints are generated using the least square principle. Bai and Perron (1998)
developed procedures to identify the number of structural breaks in an equation. They
developed two statistics, which they called "double maximum" statistics, for testing the
null hypothesis of no structural breaks against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown
number of breaks not to exceed an upper bound M. The first double maximum statistic is
given by
UDmax = max Sup FT(m)
lsmsM

where FT(m) is the F - statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no structural breaks
against the alternative of m breaks. The second double maximum statistic, WDmax,
applies different weights to the individual Sup FT(m) statistics so that marginal/? - values
are equal across values of m [see Bai and Perron (1998), p. 59 for details]. Finally, Bai
and Perron (1998) specified what they labeled the Sup FT(l + 1|Z) statistics to test the null

hypothesis of / breaks against /+1 breaks. It begins with the global minimized sum of
squared residuals for a model with 1 breaks. Each of the intervals defined by the 1 breaks
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is then analyzed for an additional structural break. From all of the intervals, the partition
allowing for an additional break that model with / + 1 breaks. The Sup FT(l + 1\V)
statistics is used to test whether the additional break leads to a significant reduction in the
sum of squared residuals. Bai and Perron (2001) developed an efficient algorithm for the
minimization of least squares problem based on the principle of dynamic programming.
They also developed a method of forming confidence intervals for the break dates under
various hypotheses about the structure of the data and error segments.
Table 4 reports Bai and Perron (1998, 2001 and 2003) statistics for the tests of
structural change in the Taylor rule and the forecast model for the 3-month Treasury bill
rate. In the Taylor rule specification the Federal Funds rate is regressed on a constant,
lagged Fed rate, price inflation GDP deflator gap and output gap. To test breaks in the
short term rate, the short term rate is regressed on its own lag, a constant, lagged GDP
deflator gap, lagged output gap and lagged 6-month Treasury bill rate. For the forecasting
model, the common lag length was selected to minimize the SIC criterion. The
minimizing lag was two. We allow up to 5 breaks, hence each segment has at least 15
observations. We also allow for heteroscedastitcity in the equation errors across regimes.
The first issue to be considered is the determination of the number of breaks. For both the
Taylor rule and the short term interest rate we find three breaks. The WDmax test, UDmax
tests and SupF tests of sequential break dates are significant at conventional significance
level. This result shows strong evidence of structural change in the Taylor rule and 3month Treasury bill rate. Other than F(5|4) and F(4|3), all other sequential test statistic
such as F(1|0), F{2\\), and F(3|2) are highly significant for both the cases. The sequential
procedure using 5% level of significance selects 3 breaks simply comparing the fitted
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models, the BIC and the modified Schwarz criterion of Liu et al. (1997) selects models
with two breaks. Given the documented facts that the information criteria are biased
downward and that the sequential procedure and the Fr(7 + l|i) perform better in this
case (Bai and Perron 2003). We conclude in favor of the presence of three breaks.
Table 5 reports the dates for the structural breaks in the Taylor rule and the 3month Treasury bill rate and their 95% confidence intervals. Both the Taylor rule and the
3-month Treasury bill rate have structural breaks during late 1960s, 1970s and mid
1980s. For the Taylor rule the three breaks are first quarter of 1969, third quarter of 1979
and first quarter of 1987. The 95% confidence intervals for these three dates are first
quarter 1967 and third quarter 1969, first quarter 1978 and second quarter 1979, second
quarter 1986 and second quarter 1989 respectively. For the 3-month Treasury bill rate the
break dates are second quarter of 1969, third quarter of 1979 and first quarter of 1987
which are very close to the breaks in the Taylor rule. The confidence intervals are third
quarter 1967 and third quarter 1969, second quarter 1979 and fourth quarter 1979, fourth
quarter 1986 and second quarter 1988 respectively. Compared to the first and third break
dates the second break has more tight intervals in both the Taylor rule specification and
3-month Treasury bill rate specification. Our paper is based on the assumption that
changes in monetary policy, as reflected by shifts in the Taylor rule, will change the
optimal weights on the variables agents use to forecast the short term interest rate. It is
very reassuring that the tests identify basically the same dates for the structural change in
both the Taylor rule and the forecasting model for the interest rate. The estimation of the
forecast error mean and variance depends on correctly specifying the variables in the
information set and identifying the structural change dates. If either is incorrect, the
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estimation of the bias and variance of the forecast error will be biased and the
standardization of the survey forecasts won't produce white noise. Our dates are also
consistent with the dates of other papers that look for U.S. interest rate. Duffy and
Warnick (2006) used a piecewise-linear classification and regression tree method to test
for multiple regimes in U.S. monetary policy. They applied the non-parametric test to two
specification of the Taylor rule. In the first specification the break dates were the first
quarter 1968, the third quarter 1979 and the fourth quarter 1986. In the second
specification the break dates were the first quarter of 1969, the third quarter of 1980, the
third quarter of 1987 and the third quarter of 1996 which are more or less similar with our
studies. Bai and Perron (2003) applied their own test and found three breaks in a
univariate model of 3-month Treasury bill rate deflated by the inflation rate. The break
dates for their studies were the fourth quarter 1966, the third quarter 1972 and the third
quarter 1980. Caporale and Grier (2000) applied the Bai and Perron test and used the
same interest rate definition as Bai and Perron. They found three breaks in the first
quarter 1967, the fourth quarter 1972, the second quarter 1980 and the second quarter
1986. Rapach and Wohar (2005) confirmed these findings in U.S. and show that these
real rate regime shifts also occur in many other industrialized countries. They applied the
Bai and Perron test to a tax adjusted real rate using long term government bond rates.
They found three breaks at first quarter 1966, first quarter 1973, second quarter 1981 and
fourth quarter 1986.
Although there is a consensus on when monetary policy changed, the actual
nature of the change is not as clearly understood. Duffy and Warnick (2006) argued that
there are two major efforts at disinflationary policy, defined by increases in the weight
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attached to the inflation gap variable. The first attempt begins after the first quarter of
1968 to counteract the inflationary financing of Vietnam War. Duffy and Warnick
(2006), however, provide little evidence to document the nature of the change. The
second break date is associated with the start of Paul Volker's Fed chairmanship and
strong disinflationary policy. During that period between the fourth quarter 1979 to third
quarter 1980, the Fed switched from using the Federal Funds rate to using non-borrowed
reserves as its operational target and set desired growth rates for the money aggregates
Ml and M2 which lasts from third quarter 1979 to third quarter 1982. This policy change
has been extensively studied and well understood. The cause of the third break date in
1986 is not very clear and no convincing argument has been made to explain it. After
decades of research, academic economists have some understanding of when and how
monetary policy shifted. It is implausible to imagine that forecasters identified these
shifts and instantly modified their forecasting rule to accurately reflect the structural
change in the economy. In the next section we examine whether the policy shifts were
learned empirically through a recursive least squares learning algorithm.

3.4.2 Test for Standardized Residuals

We now test whether the mean forecast of the 3-month Treasury bill from the SPF
is consistent with least squares learning. The Bai and Perron (2003) test identifies 3
structural breaks in the monetary policy rule and the optimal weights for the information
set used for forecasts. First the break dates in the forecasting model are considered. Using
the interest rate forecasting model the mean (27) and variance (28) of the forecast error
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are estimated separately for m=\, m=2 and when m = 3. Then the forecast errors from the
SPF are standardized using the estimated mean and variance. Assuming the information
set what we specify for the interest rate forecasting model corresponds to what
forecasters actually use, if agents engage in least square learning then the standardized of
the forecast error should be serially uncorrelated process.
Table 6 presents the autocorrelation function (ACF), Q^s statistics and their p values for the mean raw forecast error and the standardized residuals. The first column
shows the order of the autocorrelations and (fs statistics. The second column presents the
ACF, QLS statistics and their respective p - values of the raw forecast error. As we can
see they are correlated in low lags and clearly reject rationality. The third column shows
the ACF, Q^ statistics and the p - values allowing for the single most significant break
in the third quarter 1979. The standardized residuals are highly significant. This result
shows that one break and least squares learning is not enough to remove the bias from the
forecast error. Column 4 shows the result for the standardized residuals incorporating two
breaks, the break during third quarter 1979 and the break during first quarter 1987. When
we incorporate two breaks the results change dramatically. The standardized residuals are
now insignificant. Even though the theoretical mean and variance of the forecast errors
are mis-specified, the optimal weights in the information set does not change
significantly due to the omitted break in the second quarter of 1969. Hence the omission
of the third break does not affect the unbiasedness of the standardized residuals
significantly. This suggests that even though the Bai and Perron test identifies 3 breaks in
the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the breaks in the third quarter of 1979 and the first quarter
of 1987 are more important than the break in first quarter of 1969. Column 5 shows the
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standardized residuals when we incorporate 3 breaks. In this case the results are not very
different from what we have in column 4. This confirms our conjecture about the break in
the first quarter of 1969 is not so important. This suggests that the change in the optimal
weights of the parameters during the 1970s and 1980s are more significant than the
change during the 1960s.
The analysis is repeated with the median short term interest rate forecast error
from the SPFs. The same steps are used as for the mean response to test whether agents
show learning behavior. The results are shown in Table 7. The median raw forecast errors
are highly correlated upto 13 lags. When we incorporate 1 break and standardize the raw
forecast error, there is not much improvement in the results. However when 2 or 3 breaks
are incorporated the standardized residuals appear to be pure white noise. This result
further confirms that the brakes during late 1970s and mid 1980s are more significant
than the break during 1960s. The above analyses provide the evidence that agents learn
by least squares.
In Figure 9 and Figure 10, we show the forecast errors and the conditional
standard deviation of the mean corrected forecast error. As seen in Figure 9, from the
beginning of the sample in the third quarter 1982 through fourth quarter 1989, there are
large differences between the raw forecast errors and the mean corrected forecast errors.
The errors are often times very different in magnitude and sometimes move in opposite
directions. This is consistent with the structural breaks in the third quarter 1979 and
fourth quarter 1986 introducing biases into the forecast errors. Following this episode,
during which monetary policy was apparently stable, the errors begin to increasingly
move together and by the end of sample are almost identical. In figure 10, the dramatic
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increase in parameter uncertainty caused by the structural breaks in the late 1970's and
mid-1980's is indicated by the sharp rise in the conditional standard deviation falls
almost monotonically and converges. The series displayed in both figures are consistent
with agents learning the new structural parameters as data accrues over time in the new
policy regime.
The break dates in the Taylor rule and the break dates of Duffy and Warnick
(2006) are also in the analysis and the results remain the same. The results are presented
in Table 8, 9, 10 and 11.

3.5 Conclusions

In this paper we conduct a direct test to see if one quarter ahead 3-month Treasury
bill rate forecasts from the SPF are consistent with least squares learning. It is widely
believed that the U.S. monetary policy has undergone structural changes in the last few
decades. To conduct the test we use the Taylor rule and the short term interest rate
forecasting model. The purpose of using the Taylor rule specification is to match up the
structural break dates in the interest rate model with the structural break dates in the
monetary policy rule. The mean and median one quarter ahead 3-month Treasury bill
forecast errors from the SPFs are used. First we derive the properties of the forecast error
of a linear model when there are structural breaks and least squares learning. We show
that when there are structural shifts in a linear model, under least squares learning the

forecast errors are biased. This is likely the case for the SPFs since they do not observe
the shifts in real time when they forecast. In the next step we apply the Bai and Perron
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(1998, 2001, and 2003) test to identify number and dates of structural breaks in the
Taylor rule as well as in the interest rate forecasting model. We find very similar break
dates in the Taylor rule and in the interest rate model. Then incorporating those break
dates we estimate the optimal weights in the information set of the interest rate model in
each policy regime. Using these estimated optimal weights, least square learning we
estimate the conditional mean and variance of the short term interest rate forecast error.
Then the estimated conditional mean is subtracted from the mean and median 3-month
Treasury bill survey forecast error to remove the bias. If the information set of the interest
rate forecasting model is properly specified, the bias corrected standardized residuals will
be serially uncorrected. Before the bias correction and standardization the survey
forecast errors were serially correlated but after suitable modification the survey forecast
error the standardized residuals are serially uncorrected.
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Table 4
Bai and Perron (1998) Double Maximum and SupFx(l+l|l) Statistics for Tests of Multiple
Structural Breaks in the Taylor Rule and 3-month Treasury Bill Rate
Specification
Parameters:
Zt{9Tbiii , 4TaYior} q={9Tbiii, 4Taylor} p=0 h=.15 M=5
Tests:
SupFT(2|l) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4) WDmax
UDmax
Taylor rule: 24.08**
23.89**
16.13
0.00
34.46**
31.75**
T-bill:
49.06**
35.53**
25.59
0.00
54.58**
54.58**

Table 5
Bai and Perron (2001) 95% Confidence Interval for the Break Dates
Breaks
First break
Taylor Rule:
1969:1
(1967:1, 1969:3)
T-bill:
1969:2
(1967:3, 1969:3)

Second break
1979:3
(1978:1, 1979:4)
1979:3
(1979:2, 1979:4)
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Third break
1986:4
(1986:2, 1989:2)
1987:1
(1986:4, 1988:2)

Figure 9
Raw Forecast Error and Mean Corrected Forecast Error with Three Structural Breaks
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Figure 10
Conditional Standard Deviation of the Forecast Error with Three Structural Breaks
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